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Abstract
This paper describes the Duluth systems that
participated in SemEval–2019 Task 6, Identi-
fying and Categorizing Offensive Language in
Social Media (OffensEval). For the most part
these systems took traditional Machine Learn-
ing approaches that built classifiers from lexi-
cal features found in manually labeled training
data. However, our most successful system for
classifying a tweet as offensive (or not) was
a rule-based black–list approach, and we also
experimentedwith combining the training data
from two different but related SemEval tasks.
Our best systems in each of the three OffensE-
val tasks placed in the middle of the compara-
tive evaluation, ranking 57th of 103 in task A,
39th of 75 in task B, and 44th of 65 in task C.
1 Introduction
Social media is notorious for providing a platform
for offensive, toxic, and hateful speech. There is a
pressing need for NLP tools that can identify and
moderate this type of content.
The OffensEval task (Zampieri et al., 2019b)
focuses on identifying offensive language in
tweets, and determining if specific individuals or
groups are being targeted. Our approach was to
rely on traditional Machine Learning methods as
implemented by Scikit (Pedregosa et al., 2011) to
build classifiers from manually labeled examples
of offensive tweets. Our models relied on lexical
features, including character ngrams, words, and
word ngrams. We also included a dictionary based
black–list approach, and experimented with com-
bining training data from two related yet different
SemEval-2019 tasks.
Offensive language is an umbrella term that
covers hate speech, cyber-bullying, abusive lan-
guage, profanity, and so on. Recognizing offen-
sive language is an important first step in deal-
ing with different kinds of problematic text. Lan-
guage that is offensive may simply violate com-
munity standards regarding the use of profanity,
but in other cases may cross over to become abu-
sive, threatening, or dangerous. Detecting such
language has proven to be a challenging prob-
lem, at least in part because it remains diffi-
cult to make distinctions between the casual and
even friendly use of profanity versus more serious
forms of offensive language (Fortuna and Nunes,
2018; Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017).
2 Experimental Data
OffensEval is made up of three tasks that were
carried out in stages during January 2019. Task
A is to classify a tweet as being offensive (OFF)
or not (NOT). Task B takes the offensive tweets
from task A and decides if they are targeted insults
(TIN) or not (UNT). Task C looks at the targeted
insults from task B and classifies them as being
directed against an individual (IND), group (GRP)
or other entity (OTH).
Task A provides 13,240 training tweets, of
which 8,840 (66.7%) were not offensive (NOT).
Task B is made up of the 4,400 training tweets
that were offensive (OFF), where 3,876 (88.1%)
of these are targeted insults (TIN). Task C includes
the targeted insults from task B, of which 2,407
(62.1%) were targeted against individuals (IND)
and 1,074 (27.7%) were against groups (GRP).
Additional details about the task data can be found
in (Zampieri et al., 2019a)
The distribution of classes in the evaluation data
was similar. Task A has 860 evaluation tweets of
which 620 (72%) were not offensive. Task B in-
cludes 240 offensive evaluation tweets, where 213
(89%) were targeted insults. These made up the
evaluation data for task C, where 100 (47%) were
against individuals, and 78 (37%) were against
groups.
The amount of training data is modest, partic-
ularly for tasks B and C. In addition, the classes
in Task B are quite skewed. Given these factors
we decided to rely on traditional Machine Learn-
ing techniques, since these have the potential to
perform well even with limited training data.
3 System Descriptions
We created three systems for each of the three
tasks. Preprocessing was very simple : tweets
were converted to lower case and then tokenized
into character ngrams, words, or word ngrams.
In task A we relied on unigram models. How-
ever, for tasks B and C we focused on charac-
ter ngrams in order to try and find regularities in
the smaller amounts of training data available for
these tasks.
3.1 Task A
The goal of Task A was to classify a tweet as of-
fensive (OFF) or not (NOT). We relied on the de-
fault settings for vectorization andMachine Learn-
ing as provided in Scikit, except as noted below.
This results in tokenization based on space sep-
arated strings where punctuation and other non-
alphanumeric characters are discarded.
A-Sub1 is a Logistic Regression classifier that
weighs unigram features using tf-idf.
A-Sub2 is the same as A-Sub1 except that the
training data is augmented with the training data
from Semeval-2019 Task 5 HatEval (Basile et al.,
2019), a task that identifies hate speech. It
provides 22,240 training examples where 14,057
(65.2%) are not hate speech. We made the obvi-
ously incorrect assumption that tweets that aren’t
hate speech would also not be offensive. We
had hoped that doubling the amount of training
data would improve our performance despite our
flawed assumption (although it did not).
A-Sub3 is a very simple rule based on a black–
list created by merging the following sources:
• words or terms used in offensive tweets five
or more times in the OffensEval training data,
• words or terms used in hateful tweets five or
more times in the HatEval training data, and
• black–lists found via web search said to be
used by WordPress, Google, Facebook, and
Youtube1.
1https://www.freewebheaders.com/
Any word or term that appears in two or more
of these lists is selected, leading to a master black–
list of 563 words. Any tweet that includes any of
these words is labeled as offensive (OFF).
3.2 Task B
Task B seeks to identify if an offensive tweet is a
targeted insult (TIN) or not (UNT). All three sys-
tems relied on character-based ngrams and the de-
fault Scikit settings for vectorization and the spe-
cific learning method.
B-Sub1 learns a random forest classifier, and B-
Sub2 learns a decision tree. Both represent fea-
tures as 3 alphanumeric character sequences.
B-Sub3 learns a linear Support Vector Machine
from the training data. Features are represented as
3 non-space character sequences. We used non-
space characters in this case in order to capture
special characters that would be discarded by B-
Sub1 and B-Sub2. We were particularly interested
in retaining # (hashtags) and @ (user ids).
3.3 Task C
All tweets in task C are targeted insults (TIN).
The goal is to identify if the target is an individual
(IND), group (GRP), or some other entity (OTH).
All of these systems used the default settings
from Scikit for vectorization and Machine Learn-
ing, except as noted below.
C-Sub1 learns a multinomial Naive Bayesian
classifier from the training data. Features are sim-
ple unigrams made up of alpa-numeric charac-
ters. During development we noticed that Naive
Bayes tended to find more balanced distributions
of classes than our other approaches.
C-Sub2 learns a decision tree classifier from the
training data. Features are 3 character sequences.
During development we observed that this was
the only method that assigned tweets to the other
(OTH) category.
C-Sub3 learns a logistic regression classifier
from the training data. Features are word ngrams
made up of sequences of 1, 2 and 3 words that oc-
cur in more than 10 tweets in the training data.
4 Experimental Results
The official rankings in OffensEval were based
on macro–averaged F1, and accuracy was also re-
ported. The performance of individual classes was
measured by Precision, Recall, and the F1 score.
System F1-Macro Accuracy
A-TOP .83
A-Sub3 .73 .80
A-Sub2 .69 .80
A-Sub1 .68 .80
A-Baseline .42 .72
B-TOP .76
B-Sub1 .60 .88
B-Sub2 .57 .82
B-Sub3 .52 .77
B-Baseline .47 .89
C-TOP .66
C-Sub1 .48 .67
C-Sub3 .45 .62
C-Sub2 .42 .53
C-Baseline .21 .47
Table 1: Duluth OffensEval Results
The results of the Duluth Systems are summa-
rized in Table 1. X-TOP is the 1st ranked system
in each task. X-Baseline assigns each test tweet to
the most frequent class in the training data.
Next, we’ll examine the results from each task
in more detail. In the confusion matrices provided,
the distribution of gold answers (ground truth) is
shown on the rows, and the system predictions are
on the columns.
4.1 Task A
Task A asks whether a tweet is offensive (or not).
It had the largest amount of training data (13,240
examples), of which 33% were considered offen-
sive (OFF) and 67% were not (NOT). In Table 2
and the discussion that follows a true positive is
a tweet that is known by ground truth to be not
offensive (NOT) and that is predicted to be not of-
fensive (NOT). A true negative is a tweet that is
known to be offensive (OFF) and is predicted to
be offensive (OFF).
4.2 Confusion Matrix Analysis
A-Sub3 had a modest advantage over the other two
systems. A-Sub3 was a simple rule-based black–
list approach, while A-Sub1 and A-Sub2 used Ma-
chine Learning. All three systems scored identical
accuracy (80%), but in looking at their confusion
matrices some interesting differences emerge.
Table 2 shows that the rule based method A-
Sub3 has a much smaller number of false nega-
tives (112 versus 160 and 152). It also has a larger
NOT OFF P R F1
NOT 609 11 620 .79 .98 .88
OFF 160 80 240 .88 .33 .48
769 91 860 .82 .80 .77
A-Sub 1: Logistic Regression
NOT OFF P R F1
NOT 602 18 620 .80 .97 .88
OFF 152 88 240 .83 .37 .51
754 106 860 .81 .80 .77
A-Sub 2: Logistic Reg + HatEval
NOT OFF P R F1
NOT 558 62 620 .83 .90 .87
OFF 112 128 240 .67 .53 .60
670 190 860 .79 .80 .79
A-Sub3 : Rule Based, black–list
Table 2: Task A Confusion Matrices
number of true negatives (128 versus 80 and 88).
Overall the rule based system finds more tweets
offensive (190) than the Machine Learning meth-
ods (91 and 106). This happens because our rule
based system only needs to find a single occur-
rence of one of our 563 black–listed terms to con-
sider a tweet offensive, no doubt leading to many
non-offensive tweets being considered offensive
(62 versus 11 and 18).
The only difference between A-Sub1 and A-
Sub2 was that A-Sub2 had approximately double
the number of training tweets. The extra tweets
were from the SemEval-2019 hate speech task
(HatEval). We hypothesized that more training
data might help improve the results of a logistic
regression classifier (which was used for both A-
Sub1 and A-Sub2). After increasing the training
data, A-Sub2 is able to classify exactly one more
tweet correctly (690 versus 689). We were some-
what surprised at this very limited effect, although
the HateEval corpus is focused on a particular do-
main of hate speech where the targets are women
and immigrants. This does not appear to have
matched well with the OffensEval training data.
NOT offensive OFFensive
user SHIT
antifa FUCK
url BITCH
best STUPID
thank ASS
conservatives FUCKING
new IDIOT
beautiful LIAR
here DISGUSTING
brexit SUCKS
thanks SICK
love CRAP
she RACIST
day DUMB
awesome FASCIST
adorable NIGGA
safe FUCKED
voting CRAZY
funny IGNORANT
stand FOOL
justice COWARD
idea IDIOTS
there SUCK
right KILL
join PUSSY
well UGLY
amazing WORST
twitter DAMN
welcome BULLSHIT
trying ASSHOLE
Table 3: Task A Feature Analysis - A-Sub1
4.2.1 Feature Analysis
Table 3 shows the top 30 most heavily weighted
features according to the A-Sub1 logistic regres-
sion classifier (which was trained on 13,240 in-
stances). We will have the convention of upper
casing features indicative of an offensive tweet
and lower casing not offensive features. There are
some stark differences between these feature sets,
where the offensive ones are for the most part pro-
fanity and insults.
In Table 4 we show the top 30 weighted features
in A-Sub2, a logistic regression classifier trained
on the combination of OffensEval and HatEval
data. Terms relating to hatred of women and im-
migrants abound, and include numerous hash tags
(recall that our tokenization only used alphanu-
merics so # are omitted).
NOT offensive OFFensive
https BITCH
co BUILDTHATWALL
immigrant SHIT
men WOMENSUCK
antifa FUCK
url ASS
user ILLEGAL
ram BITCHES
thank SUCKS
best NODACA
new BUILDTHEWALL
conservatives STUPID
when LIAR
son IDIOT
you DISGUSTING
stand WHORE
beautiful FUCKING
kunt HOE
love SUCK
justice ILLEGALS
facebook SICK
ho FASCIST
tonight CRAP
thanks IGNORANT
wondering THESE
day RACIST
accused KILL
brexit CRAZY
alone DUMB
twitter WHITE
Table 4: Task A Feature Analysis - A-Sub2
In Tables 3 and 4 we bold face the 18 fea-
tures that were shared between A-Sub1 and A-
Sub2. This gives us some insight into the impact
of merging the OffensEval and HatEval training
data. Some generic offensive features remain in
Table 4 but are strongly augmented by HatEval
features that are oriented against women and im-
migrants.
The 13 shared terms that were indicative of the
not offensive class are shown in italics. Some
features are what we’d expect for non-offensive
tweets : love, beautiful, thanks, thank, justice and
best. Others are more artifacts of the data, user is
an anonymized twitter id and url is an anonymized
web site. Others are less clearly not offensive, and
seem related to political conversation : antifa, con-
servatives, and brexit.
Ratio Feature OFF NOT
61.0 BITCH 61 0
17.5 IDIOT 35 2
14.0 ASSHOLE 14 0
10.6 FUCK 106 10
10.2 STUPID 92 9
10.0 DICK 10 1
10.0 BITCHES 10 0
9.0 SHIT 278 31
9.0 RAPIST 9 1
7.3 FUCKED 22 3
6.3 FUCKING 82 13
5.8 SUCKS 35 6
5.5 CRAP 33 6
5.3 IDIOTS 16 3
5.0 SCUM 10 2
5.0 MORON 10 2
4.9 ASS 108 22
4.8 IGNORANT 19 4
4.5 LOSER 9 2
4.3 SHITTY 13 3
4.2 BUTT 17 4
4.0 UGLY 12 3
3.8 DUMB 23 6
3.2 PUSSY 13 4
3.2 NIGGA 16 5
3.0 PORN 9 3
2.9 HELL 38 13
2.9 BULLSHIT 23 8
2.6 SUCK 21 8
2.5 KILL 32 13
Table 5: Task A Feature Analysis - A-Sub3
However, there are some inconsistencies to
note. In Table 3 NIGGA is not necessarily an
offensive term and points to the need for anno-
tators to have subtle understandings of culture
(Waseem et al., 2018). In Table 4 kunt is a de-
liberate misspelling meant to disguise intent (c.f.
(Gro¨ndahl et al., 2018)).
Table 5 shows the top 30 terms from our black–
list system A-Sub3 that proved to be most discrim-
inating in identifying an offensive tweet. Recall
that A-Sub3 had the highest F1-Macro score of our
task A systems. The first column shows a simple
ratio of the number of times a feature is used in
an offensive tweet (OFF in 3rd column) versus a
not offensive one (NOT in 4th column). The most
discriminating feature BITCH occurred in 61 of-
fensive tweets and in 0 that were not offensive.
TIN UNT P R F1
TIN 206 7 213 .90 .97 .93
UNT 22 5 27 .42 .19 .26
228 12 240 .85 .88 .86
B-Sub1 : Random Forest
TIN UNT P R F1
TIN 188 25 213 .90 .88 .89
UNT 20 7 27 .21 .26 .24
208 7 32 240 .83 .81 .82
B-Sub2 : Decision Tree
TIN UNT P R F1
TIN 179 34 213 .90 .84 .87
UNT 21 6 27 .15 .22 .18
200 40 240 .81 .77 .79
B-Sub3 : Linear SVM
Table 6: Task B Duluth Systems
4.3 Task B
Task B includes 4,400 training tweets, all of which
are judged by ground truth to be offensive. This
is a fairly modest amount of training data, partic-
ularly given how noisy tweets tend to be. As a
result we shifted from using unigrams as features
(as in Task A) and moved to the use of character
ngrams, in the hopes of identifying patterns that
may not exist at the unigram level.
The data in Task B is also the most skewed of
all the tasks. Nearly 90% of the tweets belonged to
the class of targeted insult (TIN). Our three Task
B systems used different Machine Learning clas-
sifiers, and all tended to produce very skewed re-
sults, where most tweets were judged to be tar-
geted insults (TIN). This is clearly illustrated in
Table 6, which shows that the random forest classi-
fier (B-Sub1) was better in terms of Precision and
Recall for TIN, whereas all three classifiers strug-
gled with the UNT class.
4.4 Task C
Task C had an even smaller amount of training
data (3,876 instances). Given a targeted insult,
systems were asked to decide if the target an in-
dividual (IND), group (GRP) or other (OTHER).
These appear as I, G, and O in Table 7. The Other
G I O P R F1
G 53 25 0 78 .70 .68 .68
I 9 90 1 100 .66 .90 .76
O 14 21 0 35 .00 .00 .00
76 136 1 213 .57 .67 .61
C-Sub1 : Multinomial Naive Bayes
G I O P R F1
G 39 27 12 78 .51 .50 .50
I 21 70 9 100 .63 .70 .66
O 17 15 3 35 .13 .09 .10
77 112 24 213 .50 .53 .51
C-Sub2 : Decision Tree
G I O P R F1
G 48 25 5 78 .61 .62 .61
I 13 85 2 100 .67 .85 .75
O 18 17 0 35 .00 .00 .00
79 127 7 213 .54 .62 .58
C-Sub3 : Logistic Regression
Table 7: Task C Duluth Systems
class is very sparse, and C-Sub1 and C-Sub3 did
very poorly on it. However, C-Sub2 (a decision
tree) had slightly more success. C-Sub1 and C-
Sub2 rely on character ngrams, while C-Sub3 uses
word unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams as features.
5 Qualitative Review of Training Data
Finally, we qualitatively studied some of the train-
ing data for task A and saw that there is poten-
tial for some noise in the gold standard labeling.
We found various tweets labeled as offensive that
seemed innocuous:
• She should ask a few native Americans what
their take on this is.
• gun control! That is all these kids are asking
for!
• Tbh these days i just don’t like people in gen-
eral i just don’t connect with people these
days just a annoyance..
• Dont believe the hype.
• Ouch!
• Then your gonna get bitten
• there is no need to be like That
We also found tweets labeled as not offensive
despite the presence of insults and profanity.
• Ppl who say I’m not racist are racist. You Are
A Racist. Repeat after me
• I’M SO FUCKING READY
• Great news! Old moonbeam Just went into a
coma!
• No fucking way he said this!
• Yep Antifa are literally Hitler.
• Any updates re ending your blatant #racism
as #Windrush #Grenfell proves you are
The annotation guidelines from the OffensEval
organizers seem relatively clear in stating that all
profanity should be considered offensive, although
an annotator may intuitively wish to make a more
nuanced distinction. Resolving these kinds of in-
consistencies seems important since the data from
task A is also used for task B and C, and so there
is a danger of unintended downstream impacts.
6 Conclusion
Offensive language can take many forms, and
some words are offensive in one context but not
another. As we observed, profanity was often very
indicative of offensive language, but of course can
be used in much more casual and friendly con-
texts. This quickly exposes the limits of black–
listing, since once a word is on a black–list it use
will most likely always be considered offensive.
Identifying targeted targeted individuals or organi-
zations using lexical features and Machine Learn-
ing was extremely difficult, particularly given the
small amounts of training data. Incorporating the
use of syntactic analysis and named entity recog-
nition seem necessary to make progress.
We also encountered the challenging impact of
domain differences in identifying offensive lan-
guage. Our attempt to (naively) increase the
amount of available training data by combining
the OffensEval and HatEval data had no impact
on our results, and our feature analysis made it
clear that the two corpora were different to the
point of not really providing much shared infor-
mation that could be leveraged. That said, we in-
tend to explore more sophisticated approaches to
transfer learning (e.g., (Karan and Sˇnajder, 2018;
Park and Fung, 2017; Waseem et al., 2018)) since
there are quite a few distinct corpora where vari-
ous forms of hate speech have been annotated.
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